Threat Landscape

Threat Landscape #

Threats #

Threat Characteristics #

  • Internal vs. External - Within or outside our organization.
  • Level of Sophistication/Capability - from script kiddie to APT (advance persistant threat)
  • Resources/Funding - from hobbyists to government funded
  • Intent/Motivation - from “trill” to “warfare”, from white to black hat
    • White Hat - Act with authorization and seek vulnerabilities with the intent of correcting them.
    • Grey Hat - Act without authorization, but seek to inform targets from found vulnerabilities.
    • Black hat - Act without authorization, with malicious intent.

Advance Persistent Threat (APT) - Advanced attacks that persistent for a long time, stalking targets to attach when most strategic. #

Shadow IT - Indivduals/groups use technology/tools that are outside the approved solutions. #

Threat Actors #

  • Unskilled - (Script kiddie), little skill, depend on (automated) tools they downloaded, often don’t understand how the tools work.
    • Do not underestimate this threat and risk
    • They often randomly take targets, and there are many.
  • Hactivists - Want to reach an activist goal
    • Might take greater risk, cause their goal is more important than getting caught. Maybe even martyrdom.
  • Organized Crime - Primairy goal is to make money
    • Like to be low profile, not get caught, it takes money to make money
  • Nation-State Attackhers - Often do APT, it’s all about strategic power and influence.
    • They often search for Zero-Day attacks and exploit them.
  • Insider Threat - Employer, contractor, vendor or anyone with authorized access attacks the organization.
  • Competitors - Corporate espionage
CharacteristicUnskilledHacktivistsOrganized CrimeNation-StateInsiderCompetitor
Internal/ExternalExternalExternal (mostly)ExternalExternalInternalBoth
Sophistication/CapabilityLowAny LevelMid to HighHighAnyAny
Resources/FundingFewAny rangeManyManyFewMany
Intent/MotivationThrill/statusIdealsMoneyEconomic/Espionage/PoliticalVariedEconomic/Business

Attaker Motivations #

  • Data exfiltration - desire to obtain sensitive/IP information.
  • Espionage - organizations desiring to steal secret information
  • Service disruption - Seek to stop opperations
  • Blackmail - Seek to get money or concessions by threating to release secret info or more attacks.
  • Financial Gain
  • Ideoligy/Beliefs
  • Ethical - White hat
  • Revenge - just to embarrse or damage
  • Disruption/chaos
  • War - Manipulate the outcome of an armed conflict

Threat Vectors and Attack Surfaces #

  • Attack Surface - A llsystem/application/service that could be potentially exploited
  • Threat Vector - The actual vulnerability chosen from the attack service. The means to obtain that access.
  • Message-Based - Email is most exploited attack vector.
    • They only need ONE person to be tricked.
    • Other channel: SMS, IM, Voice call, …
  • Wired networks - physically connecting to the on-prem network, or accessing a device that’s connected to it.
  • Wireless networks - Don’t require physical access to the network, bluetooth is also a risk.
  • Systems - Individual systems
  • Files & Images - Infected files with malicious code that trigger once openend.
  • Removeable devices - USB drives, Memory cars, trick anyone to put it in their computor.
  • Cloud - Default configs, public access, of any cloud service.
  • Supply Chain - Interfere with the organization’s IT supply chain (e.g. infect OSS packages, patched hardware, …)
    • Managed Service Providers (MSPs) often have special priviledge access to an organization’s network.
    • Hard to adress and mitigate

Threat Data & Intelligence #

Threat Intelligence: Resources and activities available to learn about changes in the threat environment. #

  • Can be used for predictive risk.
  • OSINT tools/methods
  • Vunerability databases
  • Threat feeds
  • Indicators of compromise (IoCs) - Like file hashes, signaturesm ,,,

OSINT #

  • Key is to find up-to-date sources
  • Examples

Proprietary & Closed-Source Intelligence #

  • Might provide, better, curated and quality threat feeds

Use multiple feeds - To cross check if any is slow or not updating #

Threat Maps - Geographic view of threat intelligence, but notoriously unreliable (VPNs, Proxies, …) #

Assessing Threat Intelligence - regardless the source, assesment is required #

  • Is it timely?
  • Is this information accurate? - Can you rely on provided information? Often correct?
  • Is this information relevant? - Might not be relevant to your organization
  • Confidence Score - Filter/assess data based on how much they trust it.
    • The lower the score, one should be cautious to make important decisions, but not ignore the source
    • The higher the score, the more trust and cofidence can go in major decisions.
  • Many threat feeds provice a score. For example:
    • 90 - 100: Confirmed - multiple sources and direct analysis to confirm its true
    • 70 - 89: Probable - Depends on logical inference
    • 50 - 60: Possible - agreed with the analysis but assesment not confirmed
    • 30 - 49: Doubtful - Possible but not the most likey option, but there is no information that allows to disprove it
    • 2 - 29: Impropable - Possible but refuted by others
    • 1 : Discredited - Just plain not true

Threat Indicator Management & Exchange - standerized communication protocals #

  • Structured Threat Information eXpression (STIX) - XML, a json variation exists
  • Trusted Automated eXchange of Intelligence Information (TAXII) - communicate on HTTP level.
  • See Github

Information Sharing Organizations #

  • Industry-specific collaborative organizations that facilitate trusted human + machine
  • Information Sharing and Analys Centers (ISACs) - for intrastructuree owners and operators
  • National ISACS

Conducting Your Own Research. #

  • Vendor security information sites
  • Academic Journals and Technical Publications
  • Conferences and meetups
  • Social Media accounts of security professionals.