Threat Landscape #
Threats #
Threat Characteristics #
- Internal vs. External - Within or outside our organization.
- Level of Sophistication/Capability - from script kiddie to APT (advance persistant threat)
- Resources/Funding - from hobbyists to government funded
- Intent/Motivation - from “trill” to “warfare”, from white to black hat
- White Hat - Act with authorization and seek vulnerabilities with the intent of correcting them.
- Grey Hat - Act without authorization, but seek to inform targets from found vulnerabilities.
- Black hat - Act without authorization, with malicious intent.
Advance Persistent Threat (APT) - Advanced attacks that persistent for a long time, stalking targets to attach when most strategic. #
Shadow IT - Indivduals/groups use technology/tools that are outside the approved solutions. #
Threat Actors #
- Unskilled - (Script kiddie), little skill, depend on (automated) tools they downloaded, often don’t understand how the tools work.
- Do not underestimate this threat and risk
- They often randomly take targets, and there are many.
- Hactivists - Want to reach an activist goal
- Might take greater risk, cause their goal is more important than getting caught. Maybe even martyrdom.
- Organized Crime - Primairy goal is to make money
- Like to be low profile, not get caught, it takes money to make money
- Nation-State Attackhers - Often do APT, it’s all about strategic power and influence.
- They often search for Zero-Day attacks and exploit them.
- Insider Threat - Employer, contractor, vendor or anyone with authorized access attacks the organization.
- Competitors - Corporate espionage
Characteristic | Unskilled | Hacktivists | Organized Crime | Nation-State | Insider | Competitor |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Internal/External | External | External (mostly) | External | External | Internal | Both |
Sophistication/Capability | Low | Any Level | Mid to High | High | Any | Any |
Resources/Funding | Few | Any range | Many | Many | Few | Many |
Intent/Motivation | Thrill/status | Ideals | Money | Economic/Espionage/Political | Varied | Economic/Business |
Attaker Motivations #
- Data exfiltration - desire to obtain sensitive/IP information.
- Espionage - organizations desiring to steal secret information
- Service disruption - Seek to stop opperations
- Blackmail - Seek to get money or concessions by threating to release secret info or more attacks.
- Financial Gain
- Ideoligy/Beliefs
- Ethical - White hat
- Revenge - just to embarrse or damage
- Disruption/chaos
- War - Manipulate the outcome of an armed conflict
Threat Vectors and Attack Surfaces #
- Attack Surface - A llsystem/application/service that could be potentially exploited
- Threat Vector - The actual vulnerability chosen from the attack service. The means to obtain that access.
- Message-Based - Email is most exploited attack vector.
- They only need ONE person to be tricked.
- Other channel: SMS, IM, Voice call, …
- Wired networks - physically connecting to the on-prem network, or accessing a device that’s connected to it.
- Wireless networks - Don’t require physical access to the network, bluetooth is also a risk.
- Systems - Individual systems
- Files & Images - Infected files with malicious code that trigger once openend.
- Removeable devices - USB drives, Memory cars, trick anyone to put it in their computor.
- Cloud - Default configs, public access, of any cloud service.
- Supply Chain - Interfere with the organization’s IT supply chain (e.g. infect OSS packages, patched hardware, …)
- Managed Service Providers (MSPs) often have special priviledge access to an organization’s network.
- Hard to adress and mitigate
Threat Data & Intelligence #
Threat Intelligence: Resources and activities available to learn about changes in the threat environment. #
- Can be used for predictive risk.
- OSINT tools/methods
- Vunerability databases
- Threat feeds
- Indicators of compromise (IoCs) - Like file hashes, signaturesm ,,,
OSINT #
- Key is to find up-to-date sources
- Examples
Proprietary & Closed-Source Intelligence #
- Might provide, better, curated and quality threat feeds
Use multiple feeds - To cross check if any is slow or not updating #
Threat Maps - Geographic view of threat intelligence, but notoriously unreliable (VPNs, Proxies, …) #
Assessing Threat Intelligence - regardless the source, assesment is required #
- Is it timely?
- Is this information accurate? - Can you rely on provided information? Often correct?
- Is this information relevant? - Might not be relevant to your organization
- Confidence Score - Filter/assess data based on how much they trust it.
- The lower the score, one should be cautious to make important decisions, but not ignore the source
- The higher the score, the more trust and cofidence can go in major decisions.
- Many threat feeds provice a score. For example:
- 90 - 100: Confirmed - multiple sources and direct analysis to confirm its true
- 70 - 89: Probable - Depends on logical inference
- 50 - 60: Possible - agreed with the analysis but assesment not confirmed
- 30 - 49: Doubtful - Possible but not the most likey option, but there is no information that allows to disprove it
- 2 - 29: Impropable - Possible but refuted by others
- 1 : Discredited - Just plain not true
Threat Indicator Management & Exchange - standerized communication protocals #
- Structured Threat Information eXpression (STIX) - XML, a json variation exists
- Trusted Automated eXchange of Intelligence Information (TAXII) - communicate on HTTP level.
- See Github
Information Sharing Organizations #
- Industry-specific collaborative organizations that facilitate trusted human + machine
- Information Sharing and Analys Centers (ISACs) - for intrastructuree owners and operators
- National ISACS
Conducting Your Own Research. #
- Vendor security information sites
- Academic Journals and Technical Publications
- Conferences and meetups
- Social Media accounts of security professionals.